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Abstract
In this paper, we evaluate the pragmatic turn towards embodied, enactive
thinking in cognitive science, in the context of recent empirical research on
the memory palace technique. The memory palace is a powerful method for
remembering yet it faces two problems. First, cognitive scientists are currently
unable to clarify its efficacy. Second, the technique faces significant practical
challenges to its users. Virtual reality devices are sometimes presented as a way
to solve these practical challenges, but currently fall short of delivering on that
promise. We address both issues in this paper. First, we argue that an embodied,
enactive approach to memory can better help us understand the effectiveness of
the memory palace. Second, we present design recommendations for a virtual
memory palace. Our theoretical proposal and design recommendations contribute
to solving both problems and provide reasons for preferring an embodied, enactive
account over an information-processing treatment of the memory palace.
Keywords: method of loci, enactivism, functionalism, extended mind, virtual
reality, embodied cognition, anti-representationalism
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1. Introduction
Though the memory palace technique, a mnemonic making clever use of places
and images, is enjoying newfound attention by researchers on virtual reality (VR),
its use goes back centuries. According to one famous story, Giordano Bruno,
a Napolitan philosopher and influential memory palace master, earned himself
an accusation of plagiarism while presenting at Oxford in 1583. Apparently,
one attentive Oxford don did not appreciate that Bruno, in a top-off-the-head
lecture, recited long text passages from a contemporary scholar without a
reference (Rowland, 2008, p. 146). Bruno’s mnemonic use was careless, yet his
memory feats remain impressive. Cognitive scientists have been trying to make
∗Corresponding author at Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts (Bld. 19), University of
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use of the memory palace more accessible through visualising the technique’s
places and images in VR, but their efforts have so far yielded underwhelming
results. In this paper, we address the issues surrounding recent attempts at
operationalizing the memory palace through VR and we present a new and
improved way of understanding the technique. Our proposal is inspired both
by going back to the technique’s roots and by insights from embodied, enactive
cognitive science and should help towards solving the issues mentioned.
The main problem with mastering the memory palace technique is the time
and effort involved. The technique takes long-term practice, in a suitable
environment, and requires creative imagination. This explains why, given the
strength of the technique, its use in education and training practices is not
more prevalent. To increase accessibility of the memory palace, researchers have
attempted to operationalize its use through VR devices. So far, it has proved
hard to gain similar levels of remembering with the use of such devices when
compared to traditional mnemonics.
To make steps towards solving this issue, we propose to consider the difficulties
in the translation of the memory palace into VR against the background of the
so-called ‘pragmatic turn’ in cognitive science. The pragmatic turn signals a
move towards conceiving of cognition as dynamic, embodied and enactive and
away from cognition as information-processing (Engel, 2010; Engel et al., 2013).
Reframing how we think about the cognitive underpinnings of memory will help
in the design of the virtual memory palace.
What is the advantage of examining the memory palace from the perspective
of embodied, enacted cognition? We provide two related incentives. The
first stems from the observation that current cognitivist investigations into
the workings of the technique, which are based on the information-processing
paradigm, have not shed sufficient light on why it is so powerful, as we will
elaborate in the next section.1 This opens the door to the consideration of
an alternative paradigm. The second and related reason is that the memory
palace, because it leans heavily on memory scaffolding through environmental
resources, calls for a cognitive framework which places the role of the body in
the environment front and centre.
Keeping in mind the pragmatic turn, our paper develops as follows. In
Section 2, we will examine current cognitivist approaches to the memory palace
technique and show how they are unable to explain its dynamics, concluding
that there is, as we call it, an Explanation Problem. Following this, we will
argue in Section 3 that current attempts to operationalize the memory palace in
virtual reality fall short, because they depend on cognitivist understandings of
the technique. Call this the Operationalization Problem. Because addressing the
1We take inspiration from recent critique on symbolic interfacing with augmented reality
devices. Raja & Calvo (2017) argue that instead of programming augmented reality glasses (like
Google Glass) to navigate spaces uses symbols and icons like arrows and text (cf. Clark, 2003,
p. 52), such devices would instead function better if they leverage their user’s sensorimotor
capacities through changes in brightness. Froese (2014) provides a similar, generalized critique
of symbolic interfaces.
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Operationalization Problem first requires addressing the Explanation Problem,
we turn to the latter in Section 4, where we argue that an enactive account of
the memory palace captures the technique better than its cognitivist rivals. This
sets the stage for Section 5, in which we address the Operationalization Problem
by presenting design recommendations for designers of virtual memory palaces
based on our proposed enactive account. In doing so, we will rely on influential
theories in embodied cognition, such as ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979;
Chemero, 2009). We conclude with some considerations on the application of the
virtual memory palace in educational settings and for future lines of research.
2. The memory palace in cognitive science
Much of our understanding of the memory palace is derived from historical
sources. In her titular and seminal book on the art of memory, historian Frances
Yates (1966) develops a now classic account of the memory palace. Drawing on
instructions by Roman rhetoricians like Cicero and their further development by
Bruno, she explains that the memory palace strategy rests on two pillars: loci
(places) and images.2
A locus is characterised as part of a spacious environment with distinct
features. Classic examples of such environments include large and varied buildings
with decorations inside, such as churches and cathedrals. Environmental parts
which qualify as loci are usually those that stand out when one would take
a familiar route through the environment, such as a gargoyle statue at the
entrance, or a niche under a window. Loci and images play a role during both
the learning and the recalling phase of the technique. In the learning phase, one
moves through the building (preferably physically) and has to imagine placing
images of that which has to be remembered at specific locations in and around
the building. Then, during the recalling phase, one imagines moving through
the building and gets triggered by the images positioned there to reconstruct
the memory. It is advised to use vivid and personally resonating images for
maximum recall-effect.
To illustrate the use of the technique and draw out some important aspects,
let us imagine the following. While applying the technique to a talk on robot
ethics, I choose the Sydney Opera House as my locus of choice. During the
learning phase, I physically move around the Sydney Opera House. Initially I
imagine a porter at the entrance who holds a copy of Isaac Asimov’s I, Robot.
Moving on, I approach the Opera House’s wardrobe, where I imagine Aristotle
arguing with Immanuel Kant while Jeremy Bentham hands his head to a robot
attending the cloakroom. I continue to move around and create and place images
for every part of my talk. When I am ready to present the talk I enter the
recalling phase. During that phase, Asimov’s book serves to remind me that
I need to start my talk by presenting the three laws of robotics, both as an
2In fact, the technique is often called method of loci (MOL), though this is a bit of a
misnomer as it puts undue focus on the first of the two pillars.
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introductory ‘hook’ and to mark them as a starting point in robot ethics. The
image of Aristotle and Kant arguing, trigger me to say that virtue ethics and
deontology might have something to say on robotics, though both theories are
not dominant in current discussions. This is where the image of Bentham comes
in, as it cues me to say that utilitarianism is currently the dominant theory in
debates on robot ethics. The vividness and personal quality of the images will
help me remember, and placing them at specific positions in the locus will help
me to order my recollection. The use of personal imagery in combination with
the scaffolding of memories through environmental cues are the defining features
of the memory palace.
An impressive study by Eleanor Maguire and colleagues (2002), on the
functional and neurological differences between normal and high-performing
memorizers, shows that the memory palace technique is much alive today. Of
the high-performing memorizers, drawn from a pool of participants of the World
Memory Championships, 90% report using the technique for some or even all of
their tasks. The goal of the study was to capture the possible causes that could
differentiate superior memorizers from normal ones. As expected, the superior
memorizers performed significantly better in tests on both working and long-term
verbal memory. No differences in terms of general intellect or brain structure
between the two groups were found. However, functional brain-imaging showed
that the superior memorizers, in contrast with the controls, had consistent higher
activation levels in the medial parietal cortex, retrosplenial cortex, and the right
posterior hippocampus. These regions are “known to be important for memory,
and are implicated in spatial memory and navigation” (p. 93). Unsurprisingly,
these brain areas showed increased activity during the learning phase of the task.
Thus, Maguire and colleagues conclude that mnemonics like the memory palace,
which they defined as “strategies for encoding information with the sole purpose
of making it more memorable” (p. 93), constitute the main explanatory cause
for the performative difference between superior and normal memorizers. The
memory palace technique provides the “top participants of the annual World
Memory Championships ... the ability to memorize hundreds of words, digits, or
other abstract information units” and is therefore called the “most prominent
mnemonic technique” (Dresler et al., 2017, p. 1227).
As of yet, there is no single explanation for why the memory palace technique
is so effective. There is nonetheless a suspicion that the “additional motor
imagery aspect is likely the reason the method of loci has been found to be
particularly effective—a connection that has not been previously made” (Madan
& Singhal, 2012, p. 220). This in contrast to other memory strategies which
often solely depend on visual imagery. However, it is unclear exactly why motor
imagery in combination with visual imagery would explain the effectiveness of
the memory palace as a cognitive technique.
Moving further down these lines of thought, Martin Dresler and colleagues
(2017) hypothesize that with the memory palace technique “abstract and unre-
lated information units are transformed into concrete and related information
patterns that can more easily be processed by memory-related brain structures,
such as the hippocampus” (p. 1232). But what does it mean to say that “concrete
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and related information patterns” are more easily processed by brain structures?
What does the memory palace technique do which transforms a random deck of
playing cards from “abstract and unrelated information units” into “concrete
and related information patterns”? This transformation seems to presuppose
two types of information: abstract and concrete. Are there such different kinds,
and, if so, why is concrete information more easily digested? We will take a
closer look at this issue in Section 4.
The relation between, on the one hand, Yates’ account of the memory palace
as deeply dependent on both the environment for structure and the individual
for creating images, and, on the other, the information-processing paradigm of
the previously discussed experiments, remains underdeveloped. The support of
the environment is, in this paradigm, defined as the ordering of information units
which are processed by a cognizer’s brain. But that this reordering allows for
more efficient information processing is, at best, in need of further explanation,
or, as we will argue, a fundamentally flawed approach to the understanding of
the technique. Let us call this issue the Explanation Problem.
3. The virtual memory palace
The Explanation Problem, as we argue in the next section, lies at the root of
why efforts at making the memory palace accessible through VR devices, are not
yielding results comparable to traditional memory palace practice. Why is there
a need for a ‘virtual memory palace’? Memory theorists have observed that the
“primary flaw of mnemonics is that effective use often requires extensive practice”
(Madan, 2014, p. 3). And, specifically in the case of the memory palace, not only
does it take practice but it also takes time to familiarize oneself with a large
and spacious building and to translate what one wants to remember into images
which can then be placed in and around that building. Moreover, the learning
phase can be extra problematic for someone who may not always have ready
access to a locus that fits the described purpose. Large, easily accessible buildings
fit for practice are after all not always available when one wants to, for instance,
practise and memorize a talk. Furthermore, the creating-and-placing-the-images
phase of the memory palace technique depends on having a creative imagination
to come up with evocative pictures which translate to whatever it is one would
like to remember. So while the memory palace is acknowledged as a powerful
mnemonic technique, potential users are often hesitant to go through the effort
of learning it.
Virtual reality technologies might hold an answer to the previously outlined
challenges. Virtual environments can be tailor-made for and readily accessible
to the memorizer and, when a database of (personalizable) three-dimensional
models is provided, the creation of a fitting image for a certain idea in a speech
would not be so complicated. The time it takes to practice the mnemotic
would also decrease when a virtual environment is available, as there is no need
to physically travel to a suitable environment or spend time conjuring up an
imagined one. In the words of Thomas Jund, Antonio Capobianco and Frédéric
Larue (2016), given “its intrinsic spatial nature, VR seems to offer the perfect
5
technology devices to implement ... [the memory palace]. Not only [does] it allow
... immersive exploration of any given architectural environment, but it also
provides rich sensory cues (spatial contiguity, optic flow, self-directed navigation)”
(p. 533). In theory, virtual reality seems to be made, as it were, for the memory
palace technique.
Early research on investigating the memory palace through the lens of virtual
reality aimed to establish whether virtual environments can support the memory
palace technique as well as conventional, physical environments do. In an initial
and exploratory study, Eric Fassbender and Wolfgang Heiden (2006) found that
participants who interacted with a virtual environment through the use of a
personal computer and desktop monitor remembered images from that virtual
environment better than words from a sheet of paper. This study is limited
because different types of items were compared – images with words – in a
within-subject design without randomisation, and there was no between-subject
comparison that compared the virtual memory palace to a conventional one.
Furthermore, more immersive interfaces than a desktop computer monitor are
now available for a consumer market. Higher levels of immersion in virtual
environments, specifically in terms of field of vision, improve performance on
memorization (Ragan et al., 2010). This shows that it is preferable to use,
for example, a head-mounted display (HMD), rather than a desktop computer
monitor to interface with a virtual environment (see also Huttner & Robra-
Bissantz, 2016).
In a foundational study on the virtual memory palace, Eric Legge and
colleagues (2012) addressed the question of whether the memory palace technique
works as well with aid from a virtual environment as from a physical one. In order
to test this, the experimenters assigned participants to three groups: a traditional
memory palace group, a virtual memory palace group, and a control group. All
participants first practised on a memory task, recalling lists of words, then
moved through a virtual environment, and finally performed another memory
task similar to the first. The first two groups were asked to use the memory
palace on the second task, with the former imagining familiar place like their
home and the latter imagining the virtual environment just before encountered.
The third group were not given a specific strategy to use.
The results of Legge and colleagues’ (2012) research confirm that a virtual
environment does not perform worse than a conventional space. However, at
least two critical remarks can be made about the study. First, the participants in
the study were not present in the virtual environment during the learning phase
of the memory task. Instead, they were shown the virtual environment for five
minutes and those in the virtual memory palace group were then asked to use
their memory of the virtual space for their task. Hence, the study does not speak
of how effective the memory palace technique could be when the whole learning
phase is performed in a virtual environment. Second, the level of immersion in
the virtual environment was again quite low: the environment was shown on
a desktop monitor and movement occurred by means of mouse and keyboard.
This runs counter to the theory of the conventional memory palace where an
active, bodily involvement from the memorizer, in terms of navigation and image
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placement in the loci, is supposed.
In an effort to make the virtual memory palace a more immediate and
immersive experience, Jund et al. (2016) present a study in which participants
engaged with a virtual environment by means of an HMD that provided a
stereoscopic image. Three types of environments were presented. In the first,
participants were sequentially and briefly shown items for remembering in the
same frontal virtual position, without spatial cues. In the second, participants
were sequentially shown items to remember, with each item briefly appearing
next to the location of the previous item in the virtual environment. No further
spatial cues were given. The first two conditions were categorised as ‘egocentric’.
In the third, participants were guided through a virtual apartment with nine
different rooms. In this third condition, categorised as ‘allocentric’, participants
used a passive navigation technique: they were moved along a preprogrammed
path and could only move forward by pressing a key. Jund and colleagues were
surprised to find that the egocentric conditions resulted in better memorization
than the allocentric condition. In a follow-up experiment, they adjusted the
third condition and found that participants performed significantly better when
using a virtual environment of a familiar building. We do not think this result
is surprising as per Yates’ (1966) suggestion that the memorizer should use a
building which is intimately familiar to them. In the next sections, we argue
that an essential cognitive part of the memory palace technique is the training
of a cognizer’s memory in such a way that it allows for effortless re-imagining of
the building in question. In a manner of speaking, such a memorizer would carry
the building with them, though we emphasise this should not be understood
representationally. However, even with this performance improvement on the
allocentric condition, Jund and colleagues found that this condition still did
worse than the egocentric ones.
We point out two likely aspects which may help explain the poorer results in
the allocentric condition when compared to the egocentric ones in the study by
Jund et al. (2016). Both figure in the learning phase of the memorization process.
First, the participants could only indicate the moment of movement, upon which
they were passively moved along a pre-set path. Second, the participants were
presented with images, rather than given the opportunity to create and actively
place images in the virtual environment. Both aspects signify the passive relation
of the participant to the employed environment and this runs counter to the
active anchoring as described by Yates (1966). Jund and colleagues seem to agree,
at least on the first point, when they conclude that “the navigation technique
and sensory cues associated with displacement might be of primary importance
when it comes to use spatial information to support memorization” (p. 537). A
new and improved experimental design would be required to determine whether
our proposal holds merit, though, and we will provide a design suggestion in
Section 5.
In a study designed to determine whether immersive HMD interfaces perform
better in memory tasks than desktop computer monitors, Eric Krokos, Cather-
ine Plaisant and Amitabh Varshney (2019) take an embodied and embedded
approach to the virtual memory palace. Unsurprisingly, they found that the
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increased immersion of an HMD allows for better memory recall than a tradi-
tional desktop monitor. Of even more interest are the peripheral observations
they made regarding the manner of interaction between participants and virtual
environment. About a third of the participants “mentioned that they actively
used the virtual memory palace setup by associating the information relative to
their own body” (p. 10). The authors further remark on the previously discussed
tension between active and passive movement through an environment. They
refer to Barbara Brooks (1999), who found that active movement allows for more
accurate familiarisation with an environment when compared to passive move-
ment. However, as the same study also concluded that the manner of movement,
namely whether it was active or passive, had no influence on the recall of items
or their positions in the environment, Krokos, Plaisant and Varshney suggest
that “memory was only enhanced for those aspects of the environment that were
interacted with directly – particularly the environment which was navigated”
(p. 4). It should further be noted that Brooks’ findings are based on a traditional
desktop computer monitor interface with mouse and keyboard, and it would be
of interest to redo his experiment with an HMD and direct, haptic interaction of
the participants.
Until now, research on the virtual memory palace has presented the memorizer
as a somewhat passive participant. We think the observations made by Krokos,
Plaisant and Varshney (2019), on the role of the body in (virtual) environments,
merit closer attention if we are to properly understand the memory palace
technique and develop appropriate interfaces for it – like, for example, via haptic
controllers. In line with Krokos and colleagues, we propose to have future
experiments assign free movement to the memory palace users in VR. But we
suggest departing from this experiment in two ways. First, the images used for
testing in the virtual environment were pre-given, while masters of the memory
palace emphasise using personalized imagery for stronger memory evocation.
Second, the order of images in the virtual environment was signalled by symbols
(the numbers 1, 2, and so on). In Section 5, we present a way of using lighting to
direct the user’s attention in virtual environments, to move away from symbolic
cues.
With this review of current developments in the field of the virtual memory
palace in place, we conclude there is currently no conclusive answer to the
question of whether a fully immersive approach, with head-mount display and
haptic controllers, can perform as well as (or even better than) conventional
memory palace techniques. This means that there is a need for research which
compares memory performance of memory palace practitioners both using a
conventional memory palace and a virtual one.3 It would furthermore be
3Another way to look at virtual memory palaces is through the lens of augmented reality
devices. In a study performed at the MIT Media Lab, Rosello et al. (2016) present the
NeverMind application. NeverMind is designed to run on spectacles or ‘smart glasses’ which can
project images on existing physical locations in the field of vision of the user. The preliminary
study found that images projected along a route with NeverMind were better remembered
than a list of words on a paper. While definitely an interesting approach, NeverMind still
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interesting to compare the performance of memory palace practitioners not using
a virtual memory palace with ordinary subjects using a virtual memory palace,
to establish whether VR operationalization of the memory palace is on par with
traditional usage. Based on our interpretation of Yates (1966) in relation to
our review of current scientific approaches to the virtual memory palace, we
surmise that new research needs to take at least the following into account.
First, such an approach needs to investigate what sensory and navigational cues
can best support the memory palace. Second, the role of the body in virtual
environments needs to be more pronounced than it has been, specifically in
terms of how the body is virtually reproduced and whether a haptic interface
to the architecture of the locus and the placement of images can enhance the
technique. Third, this approach has to promote the active engagement of the
memorizer to navigation, choice of loci, and choice of image. Let us call this
challenge, to integrate embodied implementations of the memory palace in VR,
the Operationalization Problem. It should be clear by now that addressing the
Operationalization Problem requires rethinking our cognitive approach to the
memory palace, in other words, it requires addressing the Explanation Problem.
4. Addressing the Explanation Problem
In addressing the Explanation Problem, we consider two different and com-
peting frameworks which put the embodiment and embeddedness of the cognizer
in a larger environment centre stage: extended functionalism and enactivism. In
what follows, we connect the memory palace to broader debates on embodied,
extended cognition and evaluate the two proposals just mentioned. Our conclu-
sion is that the enactive approach offers more powerful resources to account for
the effectiveness of the memory palace than its functionalist competitor.
Our examination starts from recent suggestions made in cognitive anthropol-
ogy and philosophy of mind. Cognitive anthropologist Edwin Hutchins (2005,
p. 1564) recounts that the memory palace makes
opportunistic use of space. The spatial relations of the landmarks
do not contribute any semantic content to the problem. But the
landmark themselves do provide memory cues, and the sequential
relations among the landmarks, that were created by mapping a
particular shape of motion onto them, is inherited by the set of items
to be remembered.
This seemingly supports the idea, outlined in Section 2, that smart rear-
rangement of ‘concrete and related information patterns’ allows such patterns
to be more easily processed. However, understanding Hutchins this way would
skirt over a crucial difference between his description and the currently salient
depends on having an appropriate physical environment available. Furthermore, it suffers from
the same passive involvement of participants as the studies of Legge et al. (2012) and Jund
et al. (2016). As such, it falls beyond the scope of our paper.
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idea on the memory palace in neuroscience. Instead of focusing on how infor-
mation patterns might be picked up by the brain, Hutchins, using terms like
‘landmark’ and ‘motion’, rightly emphasizes the role of environmental triggers to
cue memories and of bodily movement to help in the ordering of them.
The relevance of environmental resources to thinking about the memory
palace has also been emphasised by John Sutton (2007). Using the distinction
between engrams, or biological memory, and exograms, or external memory car-
riers, Sutton interprets the physical environments the memory palace technique
relies on – like the Sydney Opera House in our example – as “prostheses” or
“internalized exograms.” Such prostheses, he adds, should be seen as “structuring
supplements which construct and maintain the biological processes which they
simultaneously and deeply transform” (p. 27).
We will now consider the contribution of such environmental resources from
the perspective of extended functionalism. Extended functionalism aligns with
current information-processing accounts that we have discussed in the previous
sections and can be traced back to Andy Clark and David Chalmers’ (1998)
classic paper on the extended mind. In this paper, they question the traditional
cognitive boundaries of skin and skull and argue that mind can sometimes be
constituted by parts of the environment. Clark and Chalmers argue their point
by way of their famous thought experiment about Inga and Otto. Inga and
Otto are both looking to visit the Museum of Modern Art while in New York.
But whereas Inga uses her biological memory to recall the museum’s address,
Otto, a sufferer of early-onset Alzheimer’s, retrieves it through his notebook.
The notebook, Clark and Chalmers argue, plays the same role for Otto that
biological memory plays for Inga (p. 13). In it, Otto stores the things he would
like to remember and his daily routine depends structurally, not incidentally,
on his writing – similar to how Inga depends on her biological memory. It is
important to note that this constitution claim is stronger than the trivial claim
that mind is (merely) causally affected by the environment.
Early extended mind theorists stressed the idea that physical boundaries
do not demarcate the mental and argue for this by way of the so-called parity
principle. The idea is that “[i]f, as we confront some task, a part of the world
functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no
hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the
world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998,
p. 8). The parity principle encourages us to think that restraining cognitive
processes merely to, for example, the brain, would be a case of misplaced neural
chauvinism.
The parity principle is the main reason the extended mind is usually seen as
part of the larger cognitive programme of functionalism (Clark, 2008; Wheeler,
2010, 2015), roughly the idea that mental states are to be defined and character-
ized by the job they perform. Focusing on functions, instead of material realizers,
opens up the way to think that some cognitive processes can be implemented,
at least partly, by elements outside the skull. Therefore, theorists working on
functionalism are neutral with respect to the whereabouts of cognition, thus
providing a natural home for the extended mind thesis.
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So how exactly does the memory palace relate to the extended mind hypoth-
esis? Sutton (2010) proposes that, even though mnemonic devices such as the
memory palace are not literal external artefacts, the structures they provide
function much like Otto’s notebook. In this way, Sutton expands the reach of
the initial extended mind hypothesis by arguing it can capture not only natural
and biological objects, but also cultural practices. He therefore concludes that
“taking EM [Extended Mind] seriously ... means that we treat such architectures,
systems, and practices as both cognitive and extended whether or not they
happen to be outside the skin” (p. 209).
Let us then give a tentative account of the memory palace according to an
extended functionalist framework. As said previously, mental states are, for the
functionalist, to be understood in terms of the job they perform.4 Extended
functionalists cast these jobs in terms of information-processing – recall Inga
and Otto and that “the information in the notebook functions just like the
information constituting an ordinary non-occurrent belief” (Clark & Chalmers,
1998, p. 13). Biological memory is, on this framework, understood as a process
which involves the storing and retrieving of informational content, where this
content is “sitting somewhere in memory waiting to be accessed” (Clark &
Chalmers, 1998, p. 12). When an event is experienced, some piece of information
is stored to be later retrieved when required. It has to be noted, however, that
the extended functionalist would emphasize that it “doesn’t matter whether the
data are stored somewhere inside the biological organism or stored in the external
world. What matters is how information is poised for retrieval and for immediate
use as and when required” (Clark, 2003, p. 69). In light of this framework,
we could understand the memory palace technique as a way of structuring the
contents and marking them through image-association. During retrieval, the
memorizer recollects the relevant contents while she imagines walking through
the palace. The images are encountered, the information they encode picked
up, and integrated into that which was to be remembered. On this account of
extended memory, remembered contents are conceived of as accessible, objective
commodities (see Loader, 2013, p. 167).
This type of canonical, “first wave” (Sutton, 2010) extended cognition think-
ing seems to come some way in explaining the memory palace. It helps us to think
of the memory palace as a cognitive structure which supports the memorizer
in placing images in a particular order. However, there are two flaws with the
current functionalist explanation. First, though it putatively captures the role
the environment plays in the process of encoding and retrieving information, it
neglects to explain why the role of bodily movement in both learning and recall
phase of the memory palace is of importance. Second, it is unclear how, on this
account, the extra information the memory palace would presumably require
being processed during the recall phase, actually helps with remembering.
Some extended functionalists, however, have enriched their account to accom-
modate the role of the body. Clark (2008), in advocating extended functionalism,
4For a current and general functionalist account of memory, see Fernández (2018).
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proposes two different takes on the role of the body. On the one hand, there
is what he dubs the ‘Larger Mechanism Story’ (LMS), while, on the other, we
find the ‘Special Contribution Story’ (SC). These two stories are explanatorily
competitive in that they each assign a different role to the body in the context
of embodied cognition.
On LMS, the body is thought to play a specific role on the larger information-
processing mechanism. To illustrate, Clark (2008) compares the mental cal-
culation of a sum by a human with how a snake, called Adder, may slither
across the keys of an electronic calculator in such a way as to achieve a similar
result. He concludes that in both cases the same cognitive operation is per-
formed. The process of the snake’s body moving over the keys is functionally
equivalent to whatever activity the brain putatively performs to process the
relevant information. Because the calculation of the sum is defined in terms
of symbol manipulation, extended functionalists can abstract away from the
specific material implementations of the calculation and, as such, consider that
the body of the snake is no more special than whatever parts of the brain realize
these operations. Clark associates LMS with the general (extended) functionalist
agenda.
The story is, unsurprisingly, different for SC. On SC, as advocated by Law-
rence Shapiro (2004, 2019), the role of the body is not that of one informational
piece of the puzzle among many. Instead, as the name implies, those who adhere
to SC advocate that at least some of the contributions the body makes are not
reducible to mere informational processes. The implication is that some of an
organism’s cognitive processes are shaped by the specific features of its body in a
way that does not lend itself to an explanation in terms of information-processing.
Shapiro specifies that there are at least two ways in which the body may influence
cognition: “first, it might generate associations that determine certain cognitive
proclivities; second, the body might, via activation of motor plans, facilitate or
inhibit various cognitive processes” (p. 12). Thus, on SC, for the understanding
of at least some cognitive processes the consideration of the role of the body is
required.
To justify the body’s role in shaping cognition, Shapiro (2019) draws on
empirical sources. Illustrating the first path of the body’s influence, he cites
research which shows that right-handers prefer to interact with objects on their
right side, and left-handers on their left. The idea is that the increased ease with
which people interact with objects on their dominant side informs their concept of
“good” or “preferred” (Casasanto, 2009, 2014). How would that human preference
for one’s dominant hand be translated to LMS with a functional description
such that a handless organism would exhibit similar cognitive dispositions? Or,
as Shapiro (2019) puts it, should “we expect Adder to prefer objects to its right
or its left given that it has no hands?” (p. 11).
Empirical evidence supports the notion that at least certain acts of mem-
orizing depend on a special contribution from the body, and we can divide
those into the two pathways distinguished by Shapiro. In terms of the first way,
that of association, research in psychology has uncovered the relevance of the
context-dependence of memory (Smith & Vela, 2001). One foundational study
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in this regard showed that divers who memorized material while under water
better recalled those materials while being under water, while material learned
on dry land was better recalled on land (Godden & Baddeley, 1975; Sutton &
Williamson, 2014). In terms of the second way, we can draw on the idea that
the activation of motor plans are relevant in acts of memorizing, particularly
those acts of memory which involve the unfolding of a sequence. I might, for
example, try to remember my PIN code by, physically or imaginatively, moving
my fingers in its familiar pattern, or recall the order of the alphabet by mouthing
parts of it. Scientific research supports this idea, showing that a specific starting
point and reenactment through bodily movements is involved in the recollection
of interconnected sequences both in musical parts (Ginsborg & Sloboda, 2007;
Leman & Maes, 2014; Chaffin et al., 2016) and dance phrases (Kirsh, 2013;
Stevens et al., 2003). On this account, humming a tune or moving one’s foot
involves the triggering of the next instance in a sequence, domino-style, by the
instantiation of its predecessor.
Contextual relevance and the unfolding of familiar patterns are both dis-
tinctive aspects of the memory palace technique. Yates (1966, p. 4) stresses
that the strength with which a memory is triggered depends on carefully crafted
and intense images. Furthermore, the whole environment of a memory palace
may contribute to the act of associative recall, as with the divers underwater.
Similarly, the sequence with which the images are encountered at the different
loci and, as mentioned previously, the neuroscientific evidence of brain areas
normally associated with navigation activating during the technique together
point towards the idea that motor plans unfold offline during the recall phase (see
Section 2). Such relations between the role of the body and the memory palace do
not conceive of “the body as playing an information-processing role in cognition”
Shapiro (2019, p. 9) and so the LMS, as cast in its familiar functionalist garb, is
unable to adequately capture the memory palace.
For these reasons, we propose to look at an enactivist theory of mind and
memory that is, we argue, better able to explain the special contribution of
the body in acts of remembering. Enactivism understands cognition not in
terms of the processing of information, but in terms of the participation of an
organism in sensorimotor loops of active engagement within the context of a
larger environment (Varela et al., 1991; Thompson, 2007). Evan Thompson
(2007), one of enactivism’s main architects, suggests that remembering is better
understood, not as the retrieval of a mental image, but as the reproduction of
a person’s past experience and that it “could involve emulating earlier sensory
experiences and thus reenacting them in a modified way” (p. 291).
Enactivists of a radical stripe have further developed this line of thought,
casting remembering as a dynamical, re-creative act. Radical enactivists argue
that basic forms of cognition do not involve mental representations (Hutto &
Myin, 2013, 2017). In line with this research programme, Daniel Hutto and Anco
Peeters (2018) put forward the idea that procedural memory “can be understood
as the capacity to reenact embodied procedures – often prompted and supported
by patterns of response that are triggered by external phenomena” (p. 105).
Rather than depending on the metaphor of memory as the storage and encoding
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of information, a radically enactivist take on procedural memory “would focus
not on access to the contents of a store but on remembering as a type of action”
(Loader, 2013, p. 168). Familiar patterns of response are initiated by internal or
external triggers. For example, the remembering of how to prepare a specific
meal is triggered by the ingredients and tools which are available to the cook.
These familiar patterns involve the activation of trained neural configurations,
which, according to context and circumstance, enable specific acts (see Anderson,
2014, 2015). Following a recipe in order to prepare a meal is, on this account,
not the retrieval of the stored information on that recipe, but the re-enactment
of the different steps required to make dinner according to external signposts
(the onion is glazed) which direct the individual to follow a specific familiar path
(lower the fire).
Procedural memory is in current debates commonly characterized as not
relying on information-processing (Michaelian et al., 2018), but enactivism is not
limited to accounts of procedural memory per se. Recently, a number of scholars
have proposed that episodic memory centrally involves the construction and
consideration of possible past episodes through simulative imagining (Gerrans
& Kennett, 2010; De Brigard, 2014; Michaelian, 2016). Such proposals assume
that episodic acts of remembering, because of their simulative nature, necessarily
involve representational content. Memory theorist Kourken Michaelian (2016),
who agrees that understanding procedural memory need not depend on positing
representational content, claims, by contrast, that appealing to contents in the
case of episodic memory is essential. The reason is that episodic memory is
declarative: it is available to consciousness and affects behaviour (pp. 27–28).
However, why not allow that episodic memories, like the remembering of a
conversation last week, is an act of, perhaps imperfect, simulative reconstruction
through which a proposition with the content of that conversation is formed
and available to consciousness? That this is indicative of current thinking
about memory is shown by Michaelian, who recently argued that radically
enactive remembering aligns well with an emerging tendency in discussions of
philosophical of memory which cast remembering as non-contentful (Michaelian
& Sant’Anna, 2019). In following Hutto & Peeters (2018), we see no need to
assume that all acts of remembering through simulative re-enactment depend on
the manipulation of informational content. We maintain that acts of memory,
such as using the memory palace, can be explained in a non-representational
way.5
5One might rightly ask how reconstructive or simulative processes of enactive remembering
unfold if they are not based on information storage. While this is an important issue that
deserves further elaboration, it is also an open question that needs to be addressed by enactive
approaches to memory in general. A proper discussion of this unfortunately falls outside the
scope of the current paper. As a tentative proposal, we suggest that enactive remembering
involving the previously mentioned processes depend on the sensorimotor activation of familiar
patterns. To illustrate, we refer to how artificial neural networks can be trained to generate
images (Goodfellow et al., 2014). Such networks do not store specific pixels, but depend on
adjusting the signalling strength between nodes during training. After training they may
then activate areas on a pre-given (digital) canvas and thus generate an image. Similarly, a
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Applying an enactive account of memory to the memory palace then leads
us to the following theory. In the remembering phase, the memorizer would
either walk or imagine walking through an appropriate environment, such as the
Sydney Opera House, with which she has become intimately familiar through
active, bodily exploration. The order of the loci in the environment ensures
that they are sequentially triggered during the recall phase, but it is up to the
memorizer to ensure that the loci are then associated with the images to be
remembered. During the recall phase, the memorizer will use her imagination
to sequentially reconstruct the environment through the familiar triggers. For
example, in the case of the Sydney Opera House, she would not remember the
Opera House as a whole. Instead, she would reconstruct the relevant features
while she images walking through it, letting the triggers guide her. Because of
the learned association with the images, these images will spring to mind and
can then be used by the memorizer to reconstruct whatever it is she would like
to remember. The previously discussed findings by Dresler et al. (2017), on the
structural rearrangement of neural networks for users of the memory palace,
can then be reinterpreted as the construction of a network which enables the
triggering sequence – in essence, a well-practised user of the memory palace
carries the triggers of its loci with her. The user of the memory palace is, on
the enactive account, not picking up information but reconstructing something
resembling that which she was supposed to originally remember.
Though enactive remembering seems well suited to explain the role of embod-
iment in the memory palace while those bodily engagements are not straightfor-
wardly intelligible in information-processing terms, extended functionalists may
counter with an adjustment to their theory. In a striking experiment, Wendy
Mackay and colleagues (1998) investigated the adaptation of new electronic
air-strips at an airtraffic station. In the late 1990s, traditional paper-made strips
contained information about speed and direction of incoming airplanes and were
used as an integral tool in the safe control of air traffic around Paris. Researchers
were tasked to investigate how the use of such strips could be improved or even
replaced with electronic devices. Initial trials with replacing the paper-based
system with a computer-based one met with resistance by the traffic controllers.
Advocating extended functionalism, Michael Wheeler (2010) observes that, from
the perspective of an engineer, “one is inclined to focus, naturally enough, on
the information carried by these strips. But this is not the only contribution
of the strips.” (p. 33). It turns out that the strips were used in ways beyond
merely carrying information. For example, they may be held in the hand as
person, with an adult, developed brain, may be triggered to think about the Sydney Opera
House because of a word read or a sound heard. This trigger may generate, through many
intermediary steps, partial images of white, rounded domes against the background of water.
It may even be that this person will use her consciousness to help herself generating the
memory, for instance, by asking herself “Are the distinctive white shells of the Sydney Opera
House spread across two or three separate parts of the building?” Naturally, this is a gross
simplification, but it serves as an initial step towards developing a robust enactive account of
remembering.
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a reminder, placed at an angle to indicate two planes on a potential collision
course, or, supported by the use of a strip-holding board, afford the signaling of
important flight movements through body language. Wheeler’s analysis is worth
quoting in full:
From a practical perspective, this recognition of the non-informational
contribution of the flight strips is far from idle. The testimonial ev-
idence suggests that a number of previous attempts to introduce
new computer technology into air-traffic control may ultimately have
been rejected as unworkable by the controllers precisely because the
proposed replacement systems attempted to reproduce the straightfor-
wardly informational aspects of the flight strips while ignoring the
extra factors. (Wheeler, 2010, p. 33, emphasis added.)
Wheeler concludes that “nothing about this story undermines the extended
functionalist line” (p. 33). This implies that the extended functionalist’s story
either needs elaboration on the differences between ‘straightfoward informational
aspects’ (like the writing on the strips) and material informational factors (like
the orientation of the strips), or that it need not be an information-processing
story exclusively. Extended functionalism, as advanced by Wheeler, can thus
allow for the materiality of artefacts, such as flight strips, to implement cognitive
states as well, because it is neutral with respect to what cognitive states are
made of.
Allowing extended functionalism to go beyond merely information-processing
by recognizing the material roles artefacts play, looks like a promising move to
give a functionalist account of the memory palace. As Wheeler admits, though,
his proposal needs further analysis. We see two paths which the extended
functionalist could take. The first one is to develop an account which explains
the interplay between the informational processing of memories and the role
the body plays when walking, imaginatively or not, through the memory palace.
Recall that cognitive scientists currently explain the memory palace technique
as somehow transforming abstract information units into concrete information
patterns. The functionalist needs to provide an explanation of these types of
information, explaining whether or not these are different kinds of information,
and how transformations between the two take shape. While perhaps not logically
impossible, this path seems to lead to conceptually murky waters (Hutto & Myin,
2013, Ch. 4).
A second path for the extended functionalist is to get rid of informational
talk altogether and lean on an embodied approach to the memory palace which
is entirely non-representationalist. This might seem like a radical move to some
philosophers, but it looks like Wheeler is opening the door to that possibility.
And a brief look at the history of functionalism provides ground for supporting
this move. As Gualtiero Piccinini (2010) argues, functionalism in its purest form
is merely the metaphysical claim that cognitive processes are to be understood
as structural organizations with input and output relations (see also Putnam,
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1967).6 It seems that an extended functionalist account of the memory palace
based on bodily engagement and not on information processing, is a possibility.
Yet, if functionalists surrender their commitment to the information-processing
framework, then what difference is left between extended functionalist and enac-
tivist approaches when it comes to explaining the memory palace? It seems the
functionalist’s metaphysical account would, to the extent to which they could
explain techniques such as the memory palace in terms of bodily engagement,
collapse into their competitor theories on enactivism (see Hutto et al., 2017).
Elucidating the implications of this collapse lies beyond our current argument,
but we would be interested to hear what an adapted extended functionalist story
would offer that our enactivist story does not.
The extended functionalist, then, has two options. Either develop an in-
formation processing account that is not only able to explain how the body
plays its role in the memory palace, but also the transformation of abstract
into concrete information (whatever that may be). Or, she could surrender her
commitment to information-processing altogether and adopt a fully embodied
and non-representational account of the memory palace which basically collapses
into an enactive account. In any case, the functionalist is currently not in a
position to explain the memory palace while the enactivist is not trapped in a
similar dilemma. We conclude that thinking about the memory palace from an
enactivist perspective is therefore the better option.
We submit that a radically enactive account of memory, which depends on
cues and triggers for re-enactment, may act as a clarifying lens through which to
look at mnemonic techniques that centrally involve interaction between a person
and their environment, such as the memory palace, whether virtual, imagined or
otherwise. As we have seen in the previous section, cognitive scientists currently
explain the memory palace in terms of information encoding and retrieval,
which leads to virtual memory palaces in which the memorizer is a passive
participant with only a superficially strong connection to the used locus. Such
operationalizations are better served by an enactivist approach which explains
why a multimodal memorization technique that heavily involves visualisation,
active involvement of a body with an environment, and the reconstruction of
memories is more efficient than learning words from a list. The latter mnemonic
after all, provides less triggers and cues with which to rebuild memorized items,
while the former builds upon such resources and abilities for reconstruction which
are already in place. Our next step, then, is to determine which resources and
abilities a virtual memory palace needs to work on.
6Not all functionalists might agree with the claim that pure functionalism is merely a
metaphysical claim. However, my aim here is not to present some kind of essential feature of
functionalism, but to trace the genealogy of the extended functionalist line back to its most
general shape, like Piccinini (2010) does.
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5. Addressing the Operationalization Problem
How can VR technologies support the practice of the memory palace tech-
nique? We propose that VR can support practice of the memory palace in at
least two ways. First, by supporting the user with a virtual memory palace
inspired by recent discussions in cognitive science, thus both relieving the user of
the need to go to a familiar, physical building to practise and making sure that
the virtual environment evokes those sensorimotor interactions which resemble
traditional memory palace usage. Second, by enhancing the memory palace
technique by actually going beyond that which is feasible through traditional
methods, for example by sharing virtual memory palaces with other users or by
supplying the user with visual cues to improve memorisation. These two notions
form the inspiration for the following operationalization proposal.
As said earlier, deciding on how best to support the memory palace technique
in VR depends on one’s answer to the Explanation Problem. In contrast to
existing operationalizations of the memory palace we argue for an enactive and re-
creative account of remembering. If this argument strikes true, it has implications
for the operationalization of the memory palace in VR. Specifically, it means
that such operationalizations need to be rethought through the perspective of an
embodied cognizer which takes the movement within and active engagement with
her (virtual) environment seriously and moves away from the idea that using
the memory palace is merely a way of reordering and picking up information.
In what follows, we propose that adopting an enactive take on memory will
support the practice of the virtual memory palace and that it may help to solve
the Operationalization Problem of current designs. We do so by giving concrete
design recommendations based on this enactive approach.
To move away from the information processing model of the virtual memory
palace, the role of the memorizer needs to be recast from passive observer to
active participant. In order to do so, we will single out two aspects of current
memory palace operationalizations and translate them into active, body-engaging
modes of interaction: movement of the user, and the creation and placement
of images. As discussed in the previous section, this translation has to keep in
mind the unfolding of sequences through the activation of motor plans in acts of
memory. This requires active participation of the body.
Regarding the first aspect, instead of the user being moved through a virtual
space passively, we propose that any VR operationalization of the memory palace
ought to depart from the idea that the user is actively moving herself through
an environment – say a virtual apartment or cathedral. This is not only in line
with Yates’ (1966) account, which posits the individual moving through the
space and engaging with sensori-navigational cues as an essential part of the
technique, but also with the two main insights gleaned from current memory
research as discussed in Section 2. The first is that, at least in some situations,
the activation of motor plans supports remembering – recall the examples on
PIN codes, music, and dance from the previous section. We have argued that the
memory palace is of a similar kind to those examples and thus involves motor
activation. Second, neuroscientific evidence supports the idea that brain areas
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Figure 1: Imaginary virtual memory palace with a suggested locus highlighted.
associated with spatial navigation are involved in the use of the memory palace.
As such, we think approaches where users are either passively moved or there is
no movement at all, do not support the optimal unfolding of a memory sequence.
Moving on to the second point, the placement of images, we present a similar
line of reasoning. Active participation of the body in the placement of images in
a virtual space would mean that the user should be able to do two things. First,
she should be able to either choose or, preferably, create personalised images
which may represent parts of that which she wants to memorize. A database in
the virtual space, where images can be stored and retrieved, can support the user
friendliness and re-use and easy adjustment of images. Second, the user should
then be able to place those images in distinct locations in the virtual memory
palace. Virtual reality devices with hand-held controllers that can mimic regular
hand movements seem especially suited for these use-cases.
Now that we have discussed how the memory palace technique could be
translated to VR, by using insights from an enactive approach to cognition to
improve movement and image placement, we will present ways of potentially
enhancing the virtual memory palace. Is it possible to go beyond the technique’s
traditional limitations? And if so, how?
One way in which to take advantage of computer technology is to highlight
features of the virtual environment in such a way as to support the user’s needs.
In this, we take inspiration from work done by Vicente Raja and Paco Calvo
(2017), who propose a way of looking at augmented reality based on ecological
psychology (Gibson, 1979). In discussing navigational apps, such as Google
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Figure 2: The walls in these consecutive images expand in a process of optic expansion.
Maps, they argue that instead of overloading a user by presenting yet more
symbolic information on a screen, for example, by showing a top down map with
arrows and numbers, certain pathways might be emphasised more subtly. For
instance, one can imagine a user wearing smart glasses which brighten those
areas that the user should go, and darken areas the user should avoid. This
nudges a user into the destination she wants to go to. Similarly, we suggest, parts
of one’s virtual memory palace can be highlighted during the learning phase if
they offer a memorable location to carry an image associated with part of what
one wants to remember (see Figure 1). Or, also during learning, when unfolding
the sequence of the memory the next part of the sequence in the virtual space
that a user needs to go to can be brightened, visually, as the next space to
move to. So instead of overloading the user with symbolic information, a virtual
environment might support memory performance by highlighting the relevant
affordances this environment offers to the user (Stoffregen et al., 2006).
A second way of enhancing the virtual memory palace concerns what we dub
‘sensorimotor realism.’ Note that realism here should not be understood in its
common, digitalized meaning: as the photo-realistic replication of images and
textures. Contrary to this, perhaps intuitive, idea, there is empirical evidence
which suggests that familiar sensorimotor interaction in virtual environments
contributes more to the immersion of the memorizer in her memory palace than
high-resolution imagery (Fink et al., 2009). Sensorimotor interaction in VR
further seems to improve one’s sense of agency, in the sense of experiencing
control over one’s actions and their consequences (Kong et al., 2017), which ties
in nicely with and supports the previously discussed active bodily participation.
By sensorimotor realism we mean that a VR device involving movement
needs to replicate the kind of sensory patterns we experience when we move in
real life. To illustrate, think of what occurs when you approach a wall. As you
approach the wall, you see how the texture gradients of the wall radiate from the
centre of your visual field, causing the wall to expand from the perspective of the
perceiver (see Figure 2). This is commonly described by saying that optic flow is
centrifugal in the direction of locomotion (Chemero, 2009, p. 124). The rate at
which optic flow expands is lawfully correlated to the speed to which we move
towards the object – the wall in this case. By saying that a virtual environment
must be sensorimotor realistic we mean that it must echo the sensorimotor
experience we are used to in real life. The optic flow generated while moving
towards an object in the virtual environment ought to be the same as the one
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we get when we do so in real life. Otherwise, our experience of moving through
the virtual space will feel odd and unpleasant (Bubka et al., 2008), and it will
require us to take extra effort to get attuned to the sensorimotor contingencies
of the virtual environment. Ensuring sensorimotor realism will thus add to the
immersiveness of the virtual memory palace.
Incorporating active bodily participation lies at the heart of our proposal for
operationalizing the virtual memory palace. For the translation of the memory
palace to VR, we argued that this requires the user to take control in the virtual
environment. For potentially enhancing the virtual memory palace, we proposed
to make use of sensorimotor guidance that makes optimal use of the type of
interactions the user is already familiar with.
6. Conclusion
Considering the memory palace from an embodied, enactive perspective, in
line with the pragmatic turn in cognitive science, helps in understanding why
current operationalizations of the technique in VR leave much to be desired.
Such operationalizations focus on supporting the picking up of information by
the user, but we have argued that this does not capture what is at the core of
the technique.
Instead, we presented design recommendations for improving the virtual
memory palace, focusing on embodied cognition and affordances. Smart use
of VR devices could make the learning of the memory palace more accessible
and increase the usage of one of the most powerful methods of remembering
on offer. Our design recommendations are ready for implementation. If their
adaptation yields better results than current operationalizations, this will have
both practical and philosophical implications. To start with the latter: if virtual
memory palaces based on our enactive proposal work well outside of the head,
it would provide a good reason, by way of abduction, to re-evaluate what is
going inside the head. By way of a reversed parity principle, the enactivist
research programme would have provided an impressive case in point in terms
of understanding the underpinnings of memory, placing the ball squarely in the
functionalist park.
The practical implications, if our proposal holds true, lie in making the
power of the memory palace more accessible and their advantages are obvious.
Special attention should be given to its potential use in educational settings
(Putnam, 2015). We predict that using VR devices to support learning through
the memory palace can greatly enhance learning experiences (in line with: Mäkelä
& Löytönen, 2017; Heersmink & Knight, 2018). Not only that, but activities
which are traditionally seen as boring, like the rote learning of words from
a foreign language, would potentially become a lot more fun because of the
engaged, bodily interaction. Furthermore, in classroom settings, both teachers
and students can benefit from the shared experience which VR will allow. Unlike
in the traditional technique, teachers would be able to participate in and give
feedback on how their students utilize the memory palace.
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Our proposal, though grounded on available empirical data, requires more
experimentation. Not only to test whether the hypothesized design recommenda-
tions will improve the use of the memory palace, but also to investigate aspects
of the techniques that were hereto hard or impossible to investigate. The sharing
of the same loci, as described in the previous paragraph is one aspect, but this
could be generalized to the investigation of loci which are not necessarily envi-
ronmental landmarks as traditionally imagined. For example, how will moving
objects like animals or other persons affect the technique? What about videos?
Virtual realities allow for plenty of creative freedom and the memory palace is a
worthy candidate for testing the limits of that freedom with respect to successful
memory strategies.
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